The Foreign and Defense Policies of an Independent Quebec

Dwight N. Mason

THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC held a referendum on separation from Canada on October 30, 1995. It was not the first time this issue had been brought before the provincial electorate, but this time the proposal was only narrowly defeated. For the first time, a majority of francophones voted for separation. The separatists lost because anglophones and speakers of other languages voted overwhelmingly against separation, and their votes were just barely sufficient to tip the balance. The result strengthened the separatists and endowed them with a sense of momentum—while English-speaking Canadians were left with pessimism about the future of the country. The two sides’ conflicting visions of Canada seemed impossible to reconcile.

The referendum results raised the real possibility that Quebec might soon become independent, either through agreement with Canada or unilaterally. This outcome now seems unlikely, but the issue is not going to disappear.

Ten years later, there remains a hard core of separatists. Their position has been strengthened, for the moment at least, by the growing number of scandals, principally the “sponsorship” scandal, engulfing the Liberal Party of Canada. The essence of the sponsorship scandal is the allegation that persons close to the Liberal government of former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (and perhaps to the current Paul Martin government) used federal funds for partisan purposes in Quebec, among them to weaken support for separatism in the province. These activities allegedly included bribery and kickbacks. One Liberal partisan recently observed, “it is way, way worse that I expected…. a referendum with a ‘Yes’ [i.e., in favor of separation] is a growing possibility…”1 Indeed Quebec secession is one of the issues animating the current Canadian federal election campaign.

Thus, while Quebec independence seems a distant possibility in 2005, it cannot be ruled out. For that reason, it is instructive to look back to a time preceding the 1995 sovereignty referendum, during the 1994 Quebec provincial election campaign, when the Parti Québécois and others held discussions about what kind of foreign and defense policies an independent Quebec might
Quebec’s place in Canada has long been a focus of Canadian politics, but in 1995 this issue manifested itself differently and more seriously than in previous eruptions. There were a number of reasons for this:

- The Parti Québécois, running on a separatist platform, narrowly won office in the September 1994 Quebec provincial elections. Despite its narrow victory, the party was determined to push separation through. It now held the advantage of controlling the assets of the provincial government, which it was able to train on the goal of sovereignty. The Parti Québécois almost attained that goal in the 1995 referendum and felt itself to be within range of ultimate success. Its new premier, Lucien Bouchard, had turned in a strong performance during the referendum campaign. He was intent on succeeding in the future, stating on November 21, 1995, that “the fundamental objective of the Parti Québécois remains sovereignty.”

- Independence for Quebec would have been and is now not only a practical consideration, but also one with high stakes—economically and politically. In 1995, Quebec’s population was almost seven million and the province ranked among the world’s top 25 economies when counted separately from Canada. U.S. trade with Quebec reached US$34 billion in 1994, making the province the United States’ eighth or ninth largest trading partner. Quebec would have been able to manage independence, but this would have come at a considerable economic cost. Many of the required institutions were already in place, including a ministry for international affairs that had 24 posts abroad, with several in the United States. This basic outline remains accurate today.

- After 1995, the rest of Canada began to contemplate a future without Quebec. The origins of this attitude lie in the breakdown of the traditional model of Canada as a country of two founding peoples,
French and English. Gradually that profile had changed so that by 1995, 15% of Canada’s population was foreign born, and 40% was of neither English nor French descent. As a result, many Canadians (but not most francophone Quebeckers) no longer saw their country through the prism of Canada’s origins. Weary of the sovereignty issue, much of the population outside Quebec resented what it saw as federal government pandering to Quebec when it came to various economic and procurement programs. The province’s native peoples also rejected the “two founding peoples” view of Canada, pointing out that they had been there first. Thus, the issue of Quebec’s place in Canada, and its claims to special status, seemed less and less important and legitimate to a growing number of Canadians.

These attitudes hardened after the referendum, and there was movement in English-speaking Canada to plan for appropriate terms for Quebec’s separation and for a Canada without that province. Among the ideas expressed at the time was that of partitioning Quebec to allow populations living within Quebec and opposed to independence to remain in their homes and in Canada. Prime Minister Chrétien lent his support to this idea, noting that such an action had the same logic as Quebec’s separation from Canada.

In a poll published in the December 25, 1995/January 1, 1996, issue of Maclean’s magazine, 51% of Canadians (not including Quebeckers) agreed with the proposition that “if a majority of Quebeckers wish to separate, ‘just let them go’”; 77% were opposed to giving Quebec a veto on constitutional changes; 61% were opposed to recognizing Quebec as a distinct society; and, perhaps most telling, 75% did not accept the notion that Canada is composed of two founding peoples. But a majority of Quebeckers, when polled, said they would vote for separation in a future referendum (59%) and an even greater number believed that a majority of their fellow Quebeckers would vote for separation (64%).

An example of the intensity of feeling at the time is the statement made December 7, 1995 at a meeting of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage of the House of Commons by Suzanne Tremblay, a Bloc Québécois Member of Parliament. Ms. Tremblay said, in commenting on a remark by the Committee Chairman John Harvard, that

_There are two founding nations here. We got here before you; you conquered us in 1760; you conquered us again in 1980 in the first referendum; you conquered us again in 1995 in the second referendum—but we’ll win in the third referendum._

Furthermore, it seemed that many Quebeckers believed that they would be better off with their own government, rather than the federal government, managing economic policy. This notion was probably based on Quebeckers’ reaction to the budget deficit reduction policies and targeted reductions in social programs by both the federal government and the provinces of Alberta and Ontario. Whereas in the past Quebeckers had resisted separation for fear of its economic consequences, now they saw a possible economic advantage.

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Canadians overall were pessimistic about the future of their country. Jeffrey Simpson, an astute Canadian political observer and columnist, commented in the December 20, 1995, issue of the Toronto Globe and Mail that, “Thirty years of struggle between ethnic identification in francophone Quebec and the contrasting identification demands of the rest of Canada have reached a point at which a very large number of Canadians, inside and beyond Quebec, do not believe a synthesis is possible.”

Writing in Maclean’s magazine shortly thereafter, distinguished Canadian public opinion analyst Allan Gregg, in commenting on his annual poll for that magazine and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, said:
In 20 years of analyzing poll results, this year’s set of findings is the blackest I have ever examined… Today, almost one in three Canadians—and every second Quebecker—reports a belief that by the end of this decade, our nation, as we know it, will cease to exist… Having tired of the seemingly endless, and fruitless, attempts to achieve constitutional accord, English-speaking Canada appears to be losing its resolve to embrace Quebeckers and their aspirations…. But Quebeckers, far from growing weary, seem to have been emboldened by the referendum, propelled even closer to the path extolled by the forces of national sovereignty. …As I look at these figures, I see very little cause for optimism that the public opinion fabric of the nation is strong enough to hold Canada together. Certainly it would not withstand the strains of another referendum in the near future. Quebeckers are increasingly convinced that sovereignty is inevitable. More to the point, they appear to have bought into the proposition that they have little to lose and that a deteriorating Canada offers few reasons to stay. While less convinced of the inevitability of a breakup of the country, English-speaking Canadians hold a seemingly unshakeable view that their nation is based on a partnership of 10 equal provinces that entitles Quebec to absolutely nothing that would not be available to all. Taken together, those attitudes are a prescription not only for paralysis—as we have seen—but for fracture.15

In short, the Quebec referendum seemed to have divided Quebec even further from the rest of Canada. The prospect of an independent Quebec looked increasingly likely in the relatively near future—perhaps within three to five years if the next referendum were held in 1997, as seemed probable then.16 Another scenario, albeit less likely, was a provincial election in 1996 seeking a mandate to negotiate separation.17 Speculation at the time was that if terms of separation proved impossible to negotiate, Quebec might declare independence anyway.

SECESSION REMAINS AN ISSUE

The situation has changed since then. There is no immediate prospect of another referendum in Quebec. Yet, secession cannot be dismissed entirely because a base of separatists remains and has recently been stimulated by the “sponsorship” and other scandals mentioned earlier. That base is large enough to shape Quebec and Canadian politics, and to influence U.S.–Canadian relations, for the foreseeable future.

Sovereignty also remains a principal objective of the Parti Québécois, the party in Quebec that would probably win if a provincial election were held now.18 But the ruling Quebec Liberal party does not have to call an election until at least 2007.

In the intervening time, separatism could return more forcefully. It has become an issue in the current federal election forced by a November 28, 2005 no confidence vote arising from the political situation created by the “sponsorship” scandal. The current Liberal government barely survived a vote of no confidence on May 17, 2005. The vote was 152 to 152, and the Speaker then broke the tie by voting for the government. There were a number of subsequent no confidence votes, and the government survived. But the situation remained fragile and ultimately proved to be too tempting for the opposition parties.

So far in the election campaign, the Liberals and the Conservatives have accused each other of helping the separatists in Quebec.

Anticipating the possibility that separatism would be an election issue, Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin suggested on April 13, 2005 that fixation on the “sponsorship” scandal could create winning conditions (i.e., a majority for separation) for a referendum in Quebec. At that time, he told the Liberal parliamentary caucus, “Canadians will vote for unity given a choice between the separatists and the federalists… We will expose the unholy alliance between the Bloc and the Conservatives.”19

Election or not, Quebec will continue to pursue the cause of provincial independence of action. There is general agreement among all political parties in Quebec to maximize Quebec’s autonomy. The Parti Québécois simply wishes to push further to independence.

Quebec has been quite successful in pursuing this
policy. The most recent example of this is the outcome of the First Ministers’ meeting held in the fall of 2004. Here the Quebec Liberal government managed to strengthen and extend the principle of opting out of specific federal programs yet receiving funding for those programs established not only for Quebec but for all provinces. In effect, Quebec succeeded, at least temporarily, in creating a coalition of provinces seeking more provincial powers at the expense of the federal government. Allan Gregg commented on the outcome of that meeting, asserting that Quebec had in effect “won sovereignty–association through federal accommodation” possibly at the expense of the ultimate viability of Canada itself. Whether or not this view is accurate, the meeting’s outcome showed not only that Quebec was no longer isolated, but also that it had increased its influence.

Increased provincial authority will introduce greater complexity into U.S.-Canadian relations and push the United States to deal more directly with the provinces. Operationally, this will increase the importance of the U.S. consulates general in Canada in an analytical and reporting sense and as a tool for informing and influencing provincial governments and publics.

This vision of a “deconstructed” Canadian foreign policy was articulated by Quebec Premier Jean Charest after the First Ministers’ meeting: “When Quebec is the sole government responsible for implementing a particular international agreement, it should clearly be the one making the international commitment… A Quebec jurisdiction at home remains a Quebec jurisdiction in international relations.” Presumably and ideally, from a Quebec point of view, the same approach would hold true for other provinces as well.

This Quebec view of its international role, sometimes known as the Gérin–Lajoie doctrine, is based on the fact that the Canadian constitution assigns certain powers to the provinces and others to the federal government. It is Quebec’s view that the provinces (and thus Quebec) have the right to act internationally in those areas the constitution reserves to them.

This view is not universally shared in Canada or abroad.

**FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES**

Under the circumstances, it makes sense to consider what kind of foreign and defense policies an independent Quebec might have pursued if the 1995 referendum had succeeded and if Quebec had subsequently become independent. These views persist in Quebec, and they affect Canadian foreign policy today.

There are a number of sources that offer insight into what the foreign and defense policies of an independent Quebec might have looked like at the time of the 1995 referendum. They include the Parti Québécois platform published in 1993, prior to the 1994 provincial election, statements and speeches by Quebec government and Bloc Québécois leaders, (the Bloc is a federal party based in Quebec that supports the separation of Quebec from Canada), the minority reports of the Bloc Québécois attached to the 1994 Parliamentary Reports on foreign and defense policy, and three reports prepared by consultants to the Government of Quebec on defense policy options and considerations for a sovereign Quebec. (Interestingly, these latter reports were updated in late 2001, with the authors concluding that their basic findings remain pertinent.)

Examination of these materials suggests that Quebec would have established its foreign and defense policies well in advance of and in preparation for sovereignty.

In the case of defense, the American Consulate General in Quebec reported that the sovereigntist Parti Québécois government of Quebec had definite ideas. It intended that Quebec have its own army, join NATO and NORAD, engage in peacekeeping operations, and remain a reliable partner for the United States. Quebec’s governing party expected that francophone troops based in Quebec would become the Quebec army. As an example of the Quebec government’s public thinking, the Consulate General included in its report a quotation from the legislation on sovereignty that the government of Quebec planned to enact after a successful referendum: “Quebec will maintain forces proportional to its size.
and needs…and will assume responsibilities in collective security and defense through existing international organizations.”

As for foreign policy, the separatists had two immediate goals: 1) an agreement with Canada on future economic, political, and defense relations, and 2) good relations with the United States with an initial focus on securing U.S. support for Quebec’s membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

**IMMEDIATE GOALS: AGREEMENT WITH CANADA**

Good relations with Canada were essential for Quebec because of its need to cooperate with the rest of Canada on matters of common interest, including trade, the environment, North American defense, transportation, and communications. They also extend Quebec’s ability to protect the interests of francophones living in other parts of Canada.

The central policy objective of an independent Quebec with respect to Canada as described by the Parti Québécois platform was “to maintain the Canadian economic space as it exists now” whether by a treaty of association or through specific agreements. In particular, an independent Quebec would have sought a monetary union with Canada, a customs union, and the free movement of capital and people along the lines of the Common Market. It would also have sought to negotiate an apportionment of the Canadian national debt and of federal assets in Quebec.

When the Parti Québécois came to power in 1994, these policy objectives were reiterated and included in the drafts of the Quebec legislation to declare Quebec a sovereign nation and define the referendum question. Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard also had endorsed them earlier when he was head of the Bloc and Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons in Ottawa. In Quebec that endorsement was important symbolically and politically, but it had little practical meaning in Parliament.

Reaching these objectives, however, would have been difficult and perhaps impossible given the hostility of many English-speaking Canadians, the Reform Party, the provincial premiers, and the then developing idea in the rest of Canada to set terms for Quebec independence which, if they had ultimately included partition of Quebec, would have been unacceptable to and strongly resisted by Quebec. Furthermore, economic accords might have been impossible to negotiate if Quebec had sought bilateral economic preferences not available to Canada’s NAFTA partners.

Quebec would also have needed to arrive at an understanding with Canada about a military relationship. Key factors here would have been the individual decisions of francophone military personnel based on their loyalties and prospects, and the arrangement negotiated concerning the division of federal government property. The latter agreement would have an important effect on the military capabilities of both parties and their ability to maintain or incur commitments, for example to NATO and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Beyond that, a Canadian–Quebec defense agreement would have been strongly influenced by the nature of the relationship Quebec sought with NORAD and NATO, and whether or not Quebec was included in the United States–Canada Defense Production Sharing Agreement, both matters requiring the agreement of Washington and Ottawa. The Defense Production Sharing Agreement matter is important because key elements of the Canadian defense industry are located in Quebec. In 1995, 53% of Canada’s defense electronics and aerospace industry was located in Quebec and most of the munitions used by the Canadian military were manufactured in the province. This is still generally true. Separation would have left both parties with unbalanced defense industries, which neither could sustain. The defense industry’s sustainability in Quebec would have been particularly doubtful if its major export market and access to high technology, both of which depend in large part upon its privileged relationship with the United States under the Defense Production Sharing Agreement, were cut off or significantly reduced.
THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS PLATFORM PLACED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. IN THE WORDS OF LUCIEN BOUCHARD IN MARCH 1994, WHEN HE WAS STILL LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN OTTAWA:

“Canada has been a faithful ally of the U.S. The same will be true of a sovereign Quebec. Whatever happens overseas, we will continue to share a common geopolitical space, and to contribute to its defence within the new NORAD that will emerge from upcoming negotiations. I understand that certain countries did not have the choice of being or not being neutral. But neutralism is not my cup of tea. Neutralism did not win the Cold War. And this kind of neutralism which is made of indifference and passivity will not win the peace in the hot spots of the world.”

However, Quebec’s most immediate policy goal for its anticipated relationship with the United States would have been to secure U.S. support for membership in NAFTA. Provincial leaders, as well as their federal party ally, the Bloc Québécois, tried to foster that support by claiming (with some justification) that it was Quebec’s support for the U.S.–Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and then the larger NAFTA, which made the agreements possible in Canada.

Managing such an asymmetrical relationship as would have existed between the United States and a hypothetically independent Quebec would present a challenge, but a familiar one to Canadians and Quebeckers. The classic Canadian response to this situation is to seek company in dealing with the United States through multilateral, rules-based arrangements. Quebec would probably have followed the same policy.

For example, in the Parliamentary committee reviewing Canada’s foreign policy in 1994, the Bloc Québécois members strongly and prominently agreed with the majority report on the appropriate strategy for managing relations with the United States. That portion of the majority report said that Canada ought to continue to follow its traditional policy of trying to deal with the United States in a multilateral, rules-based system, noting that “Canada’s goals can be achieved only in concert with others and within the framework of an international system based on rules rather than power. It should therefore be a primary objective of Canadian foreign policy to help develop rules-based regimes in areas of concern to Canada. For this purpose we suggest several strategies. One is to ‘multilateralize’ relations with the United States, dealing with our neighbor in multilateral forums wherever possible, and using the latter to blunt U.S. unilateral policies.”

It is likely that Quebec would have adopted a similar policy for managing its other key relationship—that with Canada. This, too, was presaged in the Parti Québécois platform preceding the 1994 provincial elections. The Parti Québécois stated that its very first step after achieving sovereignty would be to apply to join the United Nations and its specialized agencies (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, for example), as well as the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Organization of American States, the Commonwealth, and NAFTA.

While the immediate motivation was to secure international recognition, another long-term aim would have been to influence and benefit from the international “rules of the road.”

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Peering beyond their relationships with Canada and the United States, Quebec separatists had reached a number of conclusions about the world situation in 1995. These perceptions provide a useful approximation of the foreign and defense policies a sovereign Quebec might have pursued:

- The end of the Cold War had created a new situation. There was no significant military threat to Canada or to Quebec.44
- At the same time, Canada could not defend itself militarily, and it would be foolish to posit policy on the notion that it could.45
- Canada’s security is primarily dependent upon its alliance with the United States and secondarily upon membership in international alliances and organizations such as NORAD, NATO, and the UN.46 Therefore, resources expended on military functions would be better spent on strengthening international organizations that are focused on peacekeeping.47

These observations would have been even more true of a sovereign Quebec—a minor power living next to a superpower.48 Therefore, an independent Quebec might have been expected to seek influence through a policy of active diplomacy centered on strengthening the international system and focused on mediation, new and original initiatives to promote peace, and its own specialized contributions to international peacekeeping, particularly in the areas of humanitarian relief, restoration of democracy, protection of populations, and preventive diplomacy.49

In addition, the Bloc Québécois expressed specific foreign and defense policy ideas in its formal dissent to the report of the Parliamentary committee that reviewed Canadian foreign policy in 1994. These views can be summarized as follows:

**Peacekeeping**
The Bloc identified peacekeeping as a fundamental foreign policy function and recommended that it be a primary role of the Canadian armed forces, conducted “under the aegis of the United Nations.” The Bloc encouraged “the setting up of a permanent contingent available to the UN for its peacekeeping missions abroad”50 as well as a rethinking of the NATO and NORAD alliances “so that their strategic missions reflect the UN’s needs.”51

**Human rights**
Human rights and democracy should be “cornerstones” of foreign policy. Therefore, aid and trade relationships should be linked to those objectives and violations should be punished by multilateral sanctions or unilateral if sanctions when necessary.52

**Foreign aid**
“Sustainable human development must be the cornerstone” of international assistance policy, with emphasis on the poorest countries, particularly in Africa. International financial institutions should review their policies and new programs should focus on human development and encourage recipients to trim defence budgets. No bilateral aid should be given to countries “identified as having committed or been responsible for gross… human rights violations.”53

**Trade**
NAFTA should be extended “not only to open up new markets for our enterprises, but also to strengthen our political ties with the countries of Latin America.” Trade dispute settlement mechanisms within NAFTA and the World Trade Organization should be strengthened. Pressure should be put on countries with bad human rights records and penalties could “range from suspending trade benefits all the way to imposing harsher trade sanctions.”54

**United Nations**
The reform process should be pressed, and a permanent peacekeeping contingent should be made available to the United Nations. However, Quebec’s participation in peacekeeping missions should be limited to those with humanitarian objectives and only when the missions are multilateral. The Security Council should be expanded, and an Economic Security Council should be established to assist the Security Council.55

**NATO**
Military and economic participation in NATO “should be scaled back” and the saved resources redirected to “international organizations that will be
called upon to play a greater rôle in conflict resolution.” The two F-18 squadrons dedicated to NATO duty should be dismantled, contributions to the funding of joint AWACS systems ended, and contributions to infrastructure programs reduced—but a full political presence in NATO continued. NATO should be transformed into a “regional alliance which would focus more on peacekeeping missions in the European theater.” NATO’s mission should be altered so that its efforts are “devoted primarily to carrying out peacekeeping missions under the aegis of the UN.” A greater emphasis should be placed on the Partnership for Peace initiative and the rapid integration of former East Bloc countries.56

**NORAD**

The Bloc called NORAD’s mission fundamental to North American security, and said its mandate and resources “must be enhanced” and broadened to include “our economic partners in the rest of the Americas and thus extend our economic agreements…. We consider that NORAD would be a special means of linking our economic and trade interests to military alliances that can give permanence to the political stability taking form in Central and South American countries.” Specifically NORAD should establish a “common air, land and sea detection and surveillance network,” and in support of the United Nations should be “responsible for organizing peace missions in the Americas” with a strong focus on counter-narcotics action.57

**The Arctic**

The Arctic should be demilitarized and enjoy a status similar to the Antarctic. NORAD systems can ensure the effectiveness of such an agreement.58

**Ballistic missile defense**

The Bloc expressed opposition to “launching of armed space systems and the placing of any anti-ballistic missile system on Canadian territory or in aerospace above Canada.”59

Within the United States, the notion of Quebec sovereignty had not been taken seriously because it was thought to be unlikely. It was also thought unwise to plan for such an improbable contingency lest the news of such an effort leak out and encourage the separatists. Within Quebec, these “relationship issues” were understandably eclipsed by the more immediate problem of gaining sovereignty. But there was a degree of wishful thinking in Quebec about NAFTA and the U.S. position on Quebec’s admission to that system.... A statement from President Clinton shortly before the referendum made it clear that the United States now took the matter of Quebec independence seriously and did not favor it.
An independent Quebec’s relationship with the United States probably would have encountered early problems, some of them surprising to both countries. Neither partner had seriously visualized or planned for such relationship.

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Many problems would have arisen between the United States and a Quebec poised to secede, primarily due to the impact of the decision on U.S. interests. Efforts to protect its own interests would have drawn the United States into internal Canadian and Quebec affairs even before the dawn of actual independence for several reasons:

- An economic arrangement between Quebec and Canada would have affected the United States.
- United States and Mexican consent would have been required for Quebec’s admission to NAFTA, and those arrangements would also figure into any Quebec–Canada economic and trade agreements. All this and more would have to have been worked out in advance of separation if there were to be no interruption in North American trading or other key relationships.
- The United States would have wanted to ensure there was no degradation of existing North American defense arrangements, principally NORAD capabilities. Today the United States would want to see a strengthening of these arrangements.
- If, as seemed likely, minority groups and aboriginals in Quebec objected to separation, those groups knew how to affect U.S. policy by mobilizing public opinion and would have attempted to do so.

Below, each of these issues is discussed at greater length.

The prospect of a Canada–Quebec agreement
An agreement between Canada and Quebec on future economic and political relationships would affect the United States; however, as in any “divorce” affecting vulnerable third parties, a quick and amicable agreement would be in the United States’ interest because it would minimize disruption in North America caused by the separation. Numerous U.S. interests would have been affected, and the assessed impact no doubt would have dictated the U.S. response. For example, U.S. citizens then held and still do hold a considerable portion of Quebec’s and Canada’s debt. They would have inquired about the terms of an apportionment of the federal debt. They would certainly have demanded that the United States protect their interests.

Similarly, apportionment of the Canadian government’s federal assets in Quebec would have affected the United States—for example, military equipment located in Quebec that had a NORAD or NATO mission. A Quebec–Canada agreement would have affected many existing United States–Canada agreements and arrangements ranging from management of the St. Lawrence Seaway, to construction of the international space station, to the ability of Canada to continue to meet its NATO and NORAD commitments. Quebec’s ability to maintain its share of such commitments would fall under considerable scrutiny.

In 1995, Quebec’s prospects for reaching a favorable agreement with Canada did not look good, but failure to negotiate favorable terms would probably not in and of itself have stopped independence. In fact, acrimonious negotiations that were obviously failing probably would have had an accelerating effect on separation. Furthermore, France and the other nations of La Francophonie likely would have recognized Quebec in any event. As then candidate and later French President Jacques Chirac said in January 1995, “In the event that the referendum response is positive… francophone nations… and in particular France should immediately be at Quebec’s side and
Some relationship with a sovereign Quebec would have been necessary to permit NORAD to meet its mission requirements.

NAFTA

Ultimately it would have been in the United States’ interest for an independent Quebec to become a member of NAFTA, but this could not have been accomplished immediately since it would have required the agreement of the U.S. Congress and Mexico. Such negotiations would have proven to be complex and difficult, and held the potential to reopen many previously settled issues. Furthermore any Canada–Quebec economic agreement would have to be consistent with the terms of the NAFTA, thus serving to threaten or to preclude any special Canada–Quebec arrangements. For there to be no disruption of Quebec’s existing trading relations under NAFTA, negotiations with the United States and Mexico on accession would have to be completed in advance of sovereignty. Thus, the Canada–Quebec and the Quebec–NAFTA negotiations would have been interrelated and overlapping.

A complicating factor in the period of time leading up to the referendum was the continuing tendency of the Government of Quebec to dismiss the difficulty of such negotiations, indeed to assume (at least in public) that an independent Quebec could simply sign on to the NAFTA agreement or would automatically become a part of it simply because Canada is a member. These presumptions ignored the nature of NAFTA; nonetheless, they are illusions that persist in some quarters today.

NORAD

The NORAD agreement is the basis for U.S. and Canadian cooperation for air defense and space warning for North America. The United States would therefore have taken special interest in the disposition of Canadian federal assets located in Quebec that performed NORAD functions. Those assets included the CF-18 fighter interceptors stationed in Quebec as well as various radar systems, including those dedicated to controlling internal air traffic.

The relationship Quebec sought with NORAD would also have been of great interest. Some relationship with a sovereign Quebec would have been necessary to permit NORAD to meet its mission requirements. Besides air defense, examples include anti-narcotics surveillance and cruise missile defense. Quebec appeared to value the NORAD agreement, and indeed would have been unable to maintain its own air sovereignty without it. Today, Quebec’s cooperation would also be necessary to maintain internal air defense. In addition, cooperation in surveillance and control—whether or not through NORAD—would be needed for management of disasters, as well as to protect the St. Lawrence, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Hudson Strait, and Hudson’s Bay.

Adding Quebec to NORAD would have been possible. Already, NORAD integrates U.S. and Canadian military personnel into a single operational structure, and such a system could accommodate Quebec personnel. A central issue, then and now, is whether Quebec would be willing and able to find the resources necessary to support an active role for an independent Quebec in the defense of North America.

Minorities and native peoples

Distrust of the intentions of the Parti Québécois among minorities and native peoples was widespread in Quebec before the 1995 referendum. Their misgivings were sharpened after the referendum results when former Premier Jacques Parizeau attributed the sovereignty’s narrow loss to “the ethnic vote.” While the Parti Québécois repudiated these remarks, they nonetheless served to revive the question of who is a “real Quebecker,” and reinforced the idea, as a Globe and Mail editorial put it, that Quebec separatism is “a kind of ethnic nationalism… exclusively of francophone Quebec.” The Globe and Mail’s editorial analysis and the ethnic groups’ fears were substantiated when Pierre Bourgault, a former advisor to Premier
The prospects for Quebec membership in NAFTA were problematic and it was doubtful that Quebec and Canada could have negotiated an economic and political agreement that would have maintained or improved on the status quo....In the event of sovereignty (especially in the case of an unilateral declaration of independence), the United States could have been faced with an isolated Quebec and a weakened Canada whose ultimate future might itself have been in doubt.

Parizeau, was quoted in the December 1, 1995, Globe and Mail as saying, “it’s the Jews, the Italians and the Greeks who vote in an ethnic block. They’re the racists, not us…. [They]…don’t think of themselves as Quebeckers, but as Jews, Italians and Greeks.”

Those harsh remarks will not soon be forgotten in Canada or the United States. Besides causing Parizeau’s resignation, they contributed to the departure of more non-francophones from the province, increased investor concern, and added weight to proposals to partition Quebec so that those who opposed sovereignty might remain in their homes and in Canada.

If minority groups and aboriginals in Quebec believe that their rights are jeopardized by Quebec sovereignty, they certainly know how to affect United States’ policy by mobilizing U.S. public opinion. They knew this in 1995, and they know it now. The impact of the Cree on the debate and decision-making in Vermont and New York from 1989 to 1993 on the issue of the sale of Quebec hydroelectricity provides a good example of what those groups can accomplish.

The Cree took the position that they could not be bound by a decision of Quebec to become independent. In a 1995 speech to a Cree commission, Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come made the following points:

- Once again it is intended that fundamental decisions concerning Aboriginal peoples and their lands and resources will be made by others. It is intended that Aboriginal peoples and our territories will be forcibly incorporated in a new independent state with or without our consent [emphasis in the original].
- It can be seen that our lands were never historically a part of the entity called New France or Quebec...
- In the event of a unilateral declaration of independence, we will also assert Cree jurisdiction over our own people and traditional lands...

The Cree were strongly united on this position. They held their own referendum shortly before Quebec’s on whether their future should be with or without Canada; 96.3% voted to stay in Canada.

The Inuit articulated the same position in 1997.

The non-francophones and the native peoples have allies in the rest of Canada and in the United States. They have not hesitated to exploit such connections. For example, Grand Chief Coon Come told a Washington audience in 1994,

\[\text{We Cree and the other aboriginal peoples in Quebec need the support of the American people… We want you to ask tough, vigilant questions of Quebec and also if and when it requests membership in the club of nations. This membership should not be granted if its achievement can only be accomplished through the breach and denial of our fundamental human rights.}\]

The argument began to gain ground that those opposed to Quebec independence should not be forced to accept it. Not only did the Reform Party demand that the boundaries of an independent Quebec be adjusted to exclude those opposed, but the federal government’s Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs also raised the issue, saying on January 26, 1996, that,
“You can’t consider Canada divisible but the territory of Quebec sacred. If there are native groups or regional municipalities who on an equally democratic basis decided they wanted to stay in Canada, you would have to talk to those people.” Prime Minister Chrétien agreed that this analysis was “logical.”

A policy calling for the partitioning of Quebec in the event of independence would likely have driven francophone Quebeckers to more radical positions, possibly leading to civil unrest. As one columnist noted at the time, such a policy is “almost impossible to achieve without severe social disruption… it will drive more francophone Quebeckers away from federalism…. Partition would be contested, perhaps violently, and it would succeed only with the application of force.” This analysis was echoed by Quebec’s Minister for International Affairs Sylvain Simard: “If you take a decision that goes against the will of the majority of Quebec’s population, it will have to be militarily imposed by force.” The Globe and Mail editorialized, “if Quebec votes to separate, its minorities will not go along placidly.”

Some places where sentiment for partition might have existed or emerged are on the United States–Quebec border. Of particular interest is the St. Regis–Akwasasne Mohawk region straddling the New York, Ontario, and Quebec borders. Prior to 1995, American Indian reservations in this region had been trouble spots. The Mohawks at Akwasasne had a reputation for smuggling goods into Canada, including weapons probably destined for other Mohawk reservations near Montreal.

In short, minority and aboriginal discomfort with Quebec’s quest for sovereignty potentially posed a threat to public order, and such groups potentially could have drawn the United States into the controversy. That potential persists.

Quebec’s independence not in the United States’ interest

In 1995, the possibility of an independent Quebec caused the United States to wake up to a fundamental policy truth: Quebec independence would greatly complicate and perhaps unravel existing North American economic, defense, and other relationships which are in the United States best interest to preserve and strengthen.

Carl Ek and Stephen F. Clarke of the Congressional Research Service summed the matter up in a December 19, 1994 report:

Quebec independence would unquestionably complicate matters for U.S. policymakers. For example, in the short term, a split likely would disrupt the economies of both Canada and Quebec. Because Canada is by far the United States’ largest trading partner, any economic disturbance to the north could set off commercial ripples in the United States; near-term economic adjustments that followed a break might be slow, painful, and costly for the trade sectors of all three states.

The prospects for Quebec membership in NAFTA were problematic and it was doubtful that Quebec and Canada could have negotiated an economic and political agreement that would have maintained or improved on the status quo. In fact, given the prevailing atmosphere at the time, achieving any agreement was unlikely. Thus, in the event of sovereignty (especially in the case of an unilateral declaration of independence), the United States could have been faced with an isolated Quebec and a weakened Canada whose ultimate future might itself have been in doubt. This probably remains true today.

At a minimum, the United States would have been faced with a transitional period lasting several years during which North American economic and other relationships might be in disarray while new relationships were worked out. U.S. good offices would probably have been needed to complete this transition, and this situation would have been greatly complicated if there had been unrest in Quebec and disputes over its borders.
The United States has never looked favorably upon Quebec sovereignty and has consistently preferred a strong and united Canada. In 1965, U.S. Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth envisioned this when he commented in a despatch to the U.S. State Department, “There is little the United States can do to ease the problem, [of Quebec] and that little is best achieved by remaining a silent friend… our legitimate interest clearly lies in having strong and cooperative neighbors.”

Until 1995, the United States had followed Butterworth’s policy and had been restrained in stating its views favoring Canadian unity publicly lest it make matters worse—a tradition encouraged by Parti Québécois governments in Quebec.

A classic example of this dynamic is seen in a conversation between George Jaeger, a distinguished diplomat and the U.S. consul general in Quebec City and Quebec’s Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Claude Morin in April 1980, prior to U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s trip to Canada in the weeks preceding the 1980 referendum. (The 1980 referendum, also on the issue of sovereignty, ultimately failed.) The consul general reported that Morin told him that Premier René Lévesque had asked him to point out that “a significant [U.S.] statement favoring the Federalist side now will be seen as ‘first major foreign intervention’ in referendum campaign. As such it will be broadly resented in Quebec. If ‘yes’ forces win it will inevitably affect future Quebec attitudes toward [the U.S.]”

The consul general’s recommendation to the Department of State, which was accepted, was that the United States “will be best served by referring to our standard position clearly but by indirection since for the moment nothing is to be gained by our becoming a party to this emotion-laden issue ourselves.” The Government of Quebec handled this démarche professionally. The conversation and the resulting U.S. report remained classified and private for a number of years.

The United States subsequently published its position on Quebec and Canada in 1983. That position (which became known as the “mantra” in some circles) stated in part, “Americans care about what happens in Canada. They hope that Canada will remain strong and united. We do not intend to involve ourselves in internal Canadian issues.” There the matter rested for a number of years.

The 1980 game was played again, publicly and very clumsily, in 1995, when Quebec Deputy Premier and Minister of International Affairs Bernard Landry wrote on October 19, 1995, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher to protest the latter’s October 18 remarks on Quebec.

Landry wrote, in part, “Should American declarations be publicly perceived as a factor in the decision that Quebeckers are to make, they would enter into our collective memory… If victory eludes the Yes side [of the referendum] by a slim margin, as is plausible, those who did vote Yes—a clear majority of francophone Quebeckers—will be tempted to assign responsibility to the United States…”

This time the outcome was very different from the Morin–Jaeger episode for several reasons. First, there had been no conversation; second, Quebec allowed the letter to become public and appeared to be trying to intimidate the United States; and third, by 1995, the Quebec situation looked serious. Furthermore, U.S. policy was being misinterpreted by some in Quebec as indifference or even as subtle support for separatism. It now seemed advisable to state the United States position on Canadian unity clearly and in public.

Indeed the Landry affair may have been the final straw in stimulating a U.S. decision. Ambassador Blanchard later wrote, “I certainly wasn’t intimidated by his veiled threat. That very afternoon, in fact, I began thinking that the president might have to speak up.” It was important that the Quebec electorate hear a clear statement of the U.S. view of secession.

Earlier, in February 1995, President Clinton had laid out the traditional U.S. position in a speech to Parliament, saying, “The United States, as many of my predecessors have said, has enjoyed its excellent relationship with a strong and united Canada, but we recognize… that your political future is, of course, entirely for you to decide.” However mild these remarks and traditional the position, a U.S. president stating it before the Canadian Parliament was remarkable.

On October 18, 1995, in response to advice from U.S. Ambassador James Blanchard and his embassy staff, Secretary of State Warren Christopher went
further. In reply to a question from the press, Christopher stated:

I don’t want to intrude on what is rightfully an internal issue in Canada. But, at the same time, I want to emphasize how much we’ve benefited here in the United States from the opportunity to have the kind of relationship that we do have at the present with a strong and united Canada. I think it is probably useful for me to say that we have very carefully cultivated our ties with Canada…. I think we shouldn’t take for granted that a different kind of organization would not obviously have exactly the same kind of ties…. I do want to emphasize the very, very important value that we place—the high value we place on the relationship that we have with a strong and united Canada.90

What is notable here, beside the emphasis, is the reference to a possible different relationship with a new kind of Canada. The intended message was that Quebec ought not to assume that things would remain unchanged in the event of secession—among other things, an indirect reference to Quebec membership in NAFTA. This statement of the U.S. position also pointed out that the Quebec question was an “internal issue in Canada,” meaning not one that only confronted Quebeckers, but one for all of Canada to weigh and resolve. The United States subsequently went out if its way to stress this latter point.

Then, on October 25, 1995, President Clinton took a planted question on the Quebec matter at a press briefing and said:

When I was in Canada last year, I said that I thought that Canada had served as a model to the United States and to the entire world about how people of different cultures could live together in harmony, respecting their differences, but working together. This vote is a Canadian internal issue for the Canadian people to decide…. I can tell you that a strong and united Canada has been a wonderful partner for the United States. I have seen how our partnership works, how the leadership of Canada in so many ways throughout the world works, and what it means to the rest of the world to that there’s a country like Canada where things basically work. Everybody’s got problems, but it looks like a country that’s doing the right things, moving in the right direction, has the kinds of values that we’d all be proud of. And they have been a strong and powerful ally of ours. And I have to tell you that I hope that will continue…. Now the people of Quebec will have to cast their votes as their lights guide them. But Canada has been a great model for the rest of the world… and I hope that can continue.”91

CONCLUSION

In 1995, the foreign and defense policies of a sovereign Quebec would have focused primarily on the United States and Canada. Initially, an independent Quebec’s highest priority in terms of policy goals would have been to negotiate an economic and political agreement with Canada, along with membership in NAFTA. To avoid disruption in North American relationships, these negotiations would likely have involved the United States and been initiated before independence. U.S. interests would have been affected, and U.S. consent would have been necessary for Quebec’s inclusion in NAFTA. Such negotiations would have been difficult with no assurance of success. Failing to achieve economic and trade agreements with Canada and the United States, Quebec might have moved to independence anyway.

To the extent possible, an independent Quebec would probably have continued the traditional Canadian policy of conducting relations with the United States in a multilateral, rules-based context. Undoubtedly its posture toward Canada would have been similar.

A sovereign Quebec, for example, would probably have followed in Canada’s footsteps in seeking to strengthen the international system, and similarly might have benefited from multilateral links as counterweights to its larger neighbors. On the one hand, Quebec would likely have concentrated on peacekeeping in various specialized forms; and on the other might have tried to refocus NORAD and NATO in that direction. Whether or not Quebec would have had the resources and the influence to significantly redirect the policies maintained by those defense alliances seems doubtful.
The United States has consistently said that it prefers a strong and united Canada, and has maintained that Canadian unity and strength are central to the bilateral partnership. During 1995, U.S. officials stated this policy more explicitly, and by doing so probably influenced the outcome of the referendum in Quebec given the exceedingly close vote. The results were 50.6% No and 49.4% Yes. The difference in votes was 50,498 out of 4,669,554 cast with 93% of eligible voters voting. If Quebec independence were to return as a major issue in the future, it is likely that the separatists’ views on foreign and defense policy and on relations with the United States and with Canada would be very similar to those that existed in 1995. The United States view of secession would also likely be much the same as it was then.

NOTES

10. Ibid., p. 19.
11. Tu Thanh Ha & Hugh Winsor, “Bloc MP jumps on Liberal foe for unity remarks,” Globe and Mail, December 8, 1995. The article reports that Chairman Harvard’s subsequent comment on the affair to the press was that “She’s a one- woman grandstand show.”
18. See, for example, Un Project de Pays: Déclaration de principes, Programme de pays, a statement of the Parti Québécois at its 2005 Congress, June 3–5, 2005.
21. Ibid.
24. “Toward a Different Foreign Policy, Dissenting Report by the Members of the Bloc Québécois,” Foreign Policy, Principles and Priorities for the Future, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, November 1994. Hereafter cited as “Bloc Foreign Policy Dissent.”
35. The premiers had generally taken the position that it would be impossible for a sovereign Quebec to maintain an economic partnership with Canada. Globe and Mail, September 8, 1995.
40. Le Québec dans un Monde Nouveau, pp. 77-78; Lucien Bouchard, “Towards Quebec’s Sovereignty,” pp. 11-12.
42. Bloc Foreign Policy, p. 4 citing pp. 2 & 76-77 of the majority report.
43. Le Québec dans un Monde Nouveau, pp. 76-78.
45. Bloc Defense Policy Dissent, p. 73.
46. Final Report, pp. iv, xvii, 104-108, 297, 299; Bloc Foreign Policy Dissent, pp. 73, 76-77.
47. Bloc Foreign Policy Dissent, p. 4; Bloc Defense Policy Dissent, pp. 72-3, 75, 78.
49. Ibid., pp. 73, 108, 297.
50. Bloc Foreign Policy Dissent., p. 4.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
53. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
54. Ibid., p. 23.
56. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
57. Ibid., pp. 76-79.
58. Ibid., pp. 77-78.


In telegram 185 the Consul General reported that Morin had told him, “...reiteration of US preference for a united Canada in present super-charged pre-referendum atmosphere will have disproportionately heavy impact here....Average Quebecker will perceive it as ‘Ottawa-engineered outside interference’....Only certain result, Morin said, would be a new anti-Americanism in francophone Quebec....This reaction would be most intense if it was felt that US had tipped a close referendum race to the ‘No’.” The Consul General’s comment and advice was that “with referendum in full swing and tensions heightened in Quebec, anything Secretary might say to press on this issue will inevitably be exploited by one side or the other. ...We would think, however, that, given the present volatility of Quebec opinion, the less said explicitly at this point, the better.”

These telegrams were sent as a part of the effort to prepare the Secretary of State for his visit to Canada. They were sent with a high priority marking (“Immediate”), a high level marking (“Exdis,” or Executive Distribution—meaning distribute to the most senior officials), and as first person messages (meaning that they were personally from the Consul General). These markings would signal that these telegrams were important.

When Lisée wrote the book cited in footnote 85 below, he apparently did not have these telegrams. They seem not to have been released to him; although, they should have been in the group of telegrams considered for release to him in response to his request. Thus his conclusion in his book (p. 343, note 236) cited in footnote 85 below that Consul General Jaeger had not sent such messages and the inferences he drew from that conclusion deserve reconsideration.

Telegram 189 is also interesting for what it reported of Premier Lévesque’s views on separatism. The Consul General reports that Morin also told him earlier in the same conversation that “Lévesque’s real intention, which he has not so far discussed with others, is not to provoke any avoidable confrontation with Ottawa if he wins referendum and fall elections. Instead Lévesque will engage technical talks gently. Idea will be to carry talks as far as possible, but at least to point where Lévesque can claim that Quebec has achieved a ‘special status’: This will be much less than White Paper projects. Even in foreign affairs. Lévesque will in end settle for some kind of ‘joint representation’, which, Morin said, may be far cry from independentists’ expectations. Once ‘special status’ could be claimed, Lévesque will call second referendum. The more radical PQ elements then will have little choice but to support him, and the Quebec problem should thus be ‘resolved’. In other words, Lévesque wants us to know in strict confidence that he accepts fact that he will have to take the half loaf he may be able to get rather than none and that Quebec’s future should not be cause for alarm.”

Whether or not Morin and Lévesque were trying to feed the United States a disingenuous line as part of their effort to persuade the United States not to comment on the referendum is hard to say. But one wonders.


88. *Ibid.*, p. 242. (Landry’s letter was not the only reason for these thoughts. Blanchard made it clear that the principal reason was the momentum of the Yes side.)


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